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A Meta-Metaphor for Science: The True and the Fictional within the Book of Nature 
 
Tom McLeish FRS, Chair of Natural Philosophy in the Department of Physics,  
University of York, York, YO10 5DD, UK 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Evelyn Fox Keller is unsurpassed in the perspicuity with which she has drawn attention to the 
power of metaphor within science, to the work it does in defining scientific discourse, and in 
developing methodologies to analyse the consequences of semantic ambiguity. In this paper I 
consider a great metaphor for science, rather than within science. The ‘Book of Nature’ in 
which we ‘read’ the structures that science reveals is at least as old as Augustine, and enjoyed 
strong advocacy in other ages from Hugh of St. Victor, Boyle and Galileo, to name a few. Yet it 
is not without its dangers. The significance of ‘books’ changes with their availability, the 
language they are written in, the communities who are educated to read them, and their 
hermeneutic context. I will suggest ways that science has been construed differently following 
these changes in the metaphor’s meaning, including a suggestion that part of the early modern 
shift is from pure ‘reading’ of the Book of Nature, to writing it. 
 
 
Introduction: metaphors of codes, books, and nature 
 
In her 2015 article, Cognitive functions of metaphor in the natural sciences (Fox-Keller 2014), 
Evelyn writes of metaphor, ‘Indeed, the essence of a live metaphor is precisely the 
juxtaposition of similarity and difference, the manifest untruth of equating source and target.’ 
Her sensitivity and alertness to the power of metaphors in science both to illuminate and 
confuse, has been a constant, perceptive and arguably prophetic aspect of her writing 
throughout, and one that has prompted me to think afresh, and more guardedly, about the 
metaphorical cloud that envelopes my own scientific fields. In that same article, she clarifies 
two senses, often confused, of the metaphor of code when applied to the genome. The low-
level sense is the simple coding for proteins, the second is the larger sense of Schrödinger’s 
(1944) ‘code-script’ that implies an entire organism: 
 
Every complete set of chromosomes contains the full code; so there are, as a rule, two copies of the 
latter in the fertilized egg cell, which forms the earliest stage of the future individual. In calling the 
structure of the chromosome fibres a code-script we mean that the all-penetrating mind, once conceived 
by Laplace, to which every causal connection lay immediately open, could tell from their structure 
whether the egg would develop, under suitable conditions, into a black cock or into a speckled hen, 
into a fly or a maize plant, a rhododendron, a beetle, a mouse or a woman.”  
 
It is this larger, deterministic and casual agency for organisms that is Evelyn’s object of criticism 
in her celebrated Century of the Gene (Fox-Keller 2000). The continued tension over the 
interpretation, and the causal strength of the idea of a biological code made me think about the 
wider and larger metaphor of reading within nature, and as a guiding interpretation of the 
function of science as a whole. I don’t know to what extend the ‘genetic code’ inherits its 
strength and longevity from this longer narrative, but here I would like to ask that question. For 
the ‘Book of Nature’ has been with us for many centuries of not millennia. Indeed, as we shall 
see, the notion that nature is not only a book (whose author is sometimes explicit but often 
only implied), but written in code, is certainly as old as the Middle Ages. Furthermore, over the 
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period in which the ‘Book of Nature’ metaphor has been active, the social framing and even 
the technological instantiation of the idea of a ‘book’ has changed beyond recognition. The 
metaphor is, at best, a very slippery and changeable one. 
 
 
 
The Story of the Book of Nature 
 
A metaphorical story of reading has dominated natural philosophy (and its earlier, theological, 
framing), since antiquity. The first signs of the Book of Nature narrative are implied by 
parallelisms between nature and scripture. Early examples in the Church Fathers are Origen 
(CE 185–253), who wrote in his commentary on the Song of Songs, that “all the things in the 
visible category can be related to the invisible, the corporeal to incorporeal, and the manifest to 
those that are hidden” and Athanasius (ca. 296–373), who spoke of the way in which the 
creation, “as though in written characters” declares through its order and harmony the Lord 
and Creator(both quoted in Harrison 2015 p.58). 
 
The high Medieval period sees a development of a dual narrative of the Two Books: that of a 
twin revelation though the Book of Scripture and the Book of Nature. The 12th century 
scholar Hugh of St Victor in his De Tribus Diebus, wrote (Poirel 2002, 9-10): 
 
For the whole sensible world is like a kind of book written by the finger of God – that is, created by 
divine power – and each particular creature is somewhat like a figure, not invented by human 
decision, but instituted by the divine will to manifest the invisible things of God’s wisdom.  
 
Reading the two books became a dominant metaphor for the application of human sense, 
reflection, and insight into nature. As Peter Harrison (2015) points out, the analogy is by no 
means arbitrary – it accompanies the understanding that a reading of nature was a virtuous 
discipline analogous to the reading of scripture, a spiritual exercise rather than its early modern 
reorientation as an epistemology. The Two Books metaphor surfaces in the 13th century in 
reflections on the seven liberal arts of the English polymath Robert Grosseteste in the tersest of 
summaries, ‘grammar informs sight’ (cf. Gaspar et al. 2019), and in the Franciscan scholar 
Bonaventure, who hints at some of the hermeneutical difficulties such a book would present to 
an aspirant reader (quoted in Brague 2009, 80): 
 
The whole world is a shadow, a way and a trace; a book with writing front and back. Indeed, in 
every creature there is a refulgence of the divine exemplar, but mixed with darkness … 
 
Such detailed development of the metaphor is delightful as well as instructive: a book written 
‘front and back’ has ink on both the recto and verso of each parchment or vellum folio – each 
surface is covered with meaning, and there is the possibility of bleed—through of ink when the  
pages are thin, and consequent confusion of reading if care is not taken.   
 
The notion of God’s second book is one of the (many, but suppressed in much literature on 
the history of science) continuities between the medieval and early modern periods,  notably in 
Galileo, who refers not to its medieval usage but quotes Tertullian directly. But by the early 
17th century his well-known account indicates that nature’s symbols have metamorphosed from 
Hugh’s creatures into the notation of mathematics (Burtt 2003, 75).  
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Philosophy is written in the grand book of the universe, which stands continually open to our gaze. 
But the book cannot be understood until one first learns to comprehend the language and read the 
letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are 
triangles, circles and other geometric figures, without which it is humanly impossible to understand a 
single word of it; without these one wanders about in a dark labyrinth. 
 
The translation, though formally correct, is misleading in one sense, in that the ‘mathematics’ 
that Galileo has in mind for the metaphorical language of nature’s code is that of geometry (as 
is clear from his later explanation), not the algebraic, differential and field-theoretical 
formalisms of contemporary theoretical physics. Galileo was more of a medieval in this regard 
than his conventional hagiography allows for. He is also one of the last of the medieval readers 
of the Book of Nature in the cultural implications of that idea before literacy became a 
capability of more than a tiny minority. For already the twin revolutions of Reformation and. 
Printing by moveable type had transformed the referent of book-reading, transforming the 
metaphor once more. For if a central tenet of the reformers was that the reading and 
interpretation of scripture, once the prerogative of the priesthood, becomes the personal task 
of every vernacular reader, then a similar democratisation of the reading of the second ‘book’ 
might also be expected on the grounds of cultural history alone. So it proves to be. Towards 
the end of the 17th century the narrative of God’s second book of Nature is central to the 
emerging hermeneutical stance of early modern science, in protestant jurisdictions at least. An 
important example is found in Boyle’s advocacy of the early form of citizen-science known as 
‘Occasional Meditation.’ He writes (quoted in Hunter 1990, 284): 
 
The World is a Great Book, not so much of Nature as of the God of Nature, … crowded with 
instructive Lessons, if we had but the Skill, and would take the Pains, to extract and pick them out: 
the Creatures are the true Aegyptian Hieroglyphicks, that under the rude form of Birds, and Beasts 
etc. conceal the mysterious secrets of Knowledge and of Piety. 
 
The context is key: Boyle is encouraging his lay readers to keep a notebook always to hand, to 
record their impressions of nature through everyday encounters, and to ponder their meaning. 
Both reading and interpretation of nature become the task of everyone, within the same daily 
rhythm as Bible reading and private meditation. The reading of scripture and the reading of 
nature have both undergone a reformation, although continuities of personal virtuous practice 
are perceptible here even as natural philosophy is pivoting towards epistemology and away 
from piety. 
 
The metaphor finds its final flourishing in the natural theology of Paley and the authors of the 
Bridgewater Treatises (Topham 1992). Their series subtitle is less frequently reproduced: it is 
on the Power, Wisdom and Goodness of God as Manifested in the Creation. To follow Paley 
in his deduction of a personal creative agent of interventionist design in the structure of a 
biological lensed eye is precisely to read and interpret the text of the Second Book in terms of 
its author. Yet as Topham (1992) points out, the Treatises themselves track a growing tendency 
to emphasise scientific content at the expense of the level of theological hermeneutic that Paley 
had included in his Natural Theology (Paley 1802). They progressively de-emphasised the 
import of their series subtitle. The book of nature was already distancing itself from the book 
of scripture as the 19th century’s disciplinary fragmentation and disassociation developed. In a 
final contextual twist to the transformation of the metaphor before the 20th century, the great 
mathematical physicist Maxwell noted the potential consequences that publication was no 
longer confined to the form of the codex and the book, as Matthew Stanley has pointed out 
(quoted in Stanley 2015, 41): 
 4 
 
Perhaps the ‘book’, as it has been called, of nature is regularly paged; if so no doubt the introductory 
parts will explain those that follow, and the methods taught in the first chapters will be taken for 
granted and used as illustrations in the more advanced parts of the course; but if it is not a ‘book’ at 
all but a magazine, nothing is more foolish than to suppose that one part can throw light upon 
another. 
 
The narrative of the Two Books has been a compelling one since antiquity for aesthetic, 
cultural and theological reasons. For those reasons, however, the metaphor is fluid, taking on 
the shape of the significance of books and their writing and reading in all three corresponding 
domains of practice. The parallel growth of literacy and science in Europe from the medieval 
period onwards, the emergence of printing, widespread education, and the new forms of 
writing and publication that accompany early modern science, also render the metaphor itself 
almost irresistible. As the cultural frame around the production, reading and significance of 
books changed, so does the interpretation of the idea of a second divine volume. But simplistic 
adherence to the metaphorical reading of the Book of Nature as a conceptual framing for 
science generates a set of irresolvable problems at its nexus with theology. It is well to heed the 
warnings with which Augustine characteristically hedged its use, writing in late antiquity 
(Augustine Contra Faustum XXXII, 20): 
 
But had you begun with looking on the book of nature as the production of the Creator of all, and 
had you believed that your own finite understanding might be at fault wherever anything seemed to be 
amiss, instead of venturing to find fault with the works of God, you would not have been led into 
these impious follies and blasphemous fancies with which, in your ignorance of what evil really is, you 
heap all evils upon God.  
 
Augustine thinks of the poor scribe, who fails to understand what is before him, but attributes 
that to a failure of the author (or perhaps to a previous transcriber), rather than to his own 
limitations. I have come across several instances of such scribal presumption in the case of 
medieval mathematical natural philosophy, especially when this is highly original. An example 
is in the De Generatione Sonorum (on the generation of sounds) of Robert Grosseteste, where 
the author advances a highly sophisticated theory of geometrical combinations of motion in the 
parametric definition of both the symbols by which vowel sounds are written in Latin and 
Greek, and (by hypothesis) the forms of the vocal tract when pronouncing them (Gaspar et al. 
2019).  
 
The relevance of the long-history of the Book of Nature metaphor to the notion of coding was 
therefore implicit from the beginning. Long before the hints of Hugh of. St. Victor and 
Bonaventure, or the explicit reference to the hieroglyphic encoding of the Book by Boyle, the 
problems of decoding, and an anticipation of the consequences of flawed decoding, were 
anticipated by Augustine in his development of the metaphor. It is fascinating to speculate to 
what extent this grand metaphor (of nature as a whole constituting a code) might have affected 
the choice of coding as a language in which to express (in either weak - protein or strong - 
organism forms of coding) the work of the gene. However, in the task of critically appraising 
that much narrower field of application of writing and reading within nature, it is of interest to 
examine where the wider metaphor breaks down. 
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Problems with the Metaphor of the Second Book 
 
Augustine anticipates the first flaw in the Two Books metaphor – that the understanding of 
nature, and its representation in current forms of natural philosophy, will be culturally 
constrained, and subject to the projection of ethical and other human values onto material 
form which cannot support them. Strong advocate of the universal accessibility of the natural 
world as reflecting God’s creative power as he is, Augustine knows that overinterpretation of 
nature as a message in itself is a wrong turning. The long story of theodicy (Southgate 2003) 
raises questions that humans have always wanted to ask of the apparent disorder of nature but 
when they do, what they see in nature is more likely to pattern the phenomenon of a mirror 
than a book. Dawkin’s attribution of ‘selfishness’ to an abstracted form within nature, from this 
perspective, joins a long tradition of misattribution, which includes ‘cruelty’, ‘capriciousness’ 
and ‘intemperance’. 
 
On the other hand, once a metaphor has a firm hold on its object, then the interpretative flow 
can even reverse. One of the consequences of the Reformation was a transformation in the 
significance, social relations and expectations around ‘God’s First Book’. The medieval Bible 
was rare, expensive, written in Latin by scribal copying, and read and interpreted by the 
educated (and priested) few. By the sixteenth century in Protestant Europe, it was printed, 
relatively cheap and accessible, written in the vernacular, and the means of quotidian piety. If 
transformation from access interpretation by the few to the many was the effect of the 
Reformation on the reading of the First Book, would we not expect a similar induced effect 
upon the Second, if the metaphorical coherence were sufficiently strong? Indeed, the 
emergence of a sort of ‘lay science’ is precisely what we observe emerging in the ‘Occasional 
Meditation’ of Boyle, Flavell and others, by the latter seventeenth century (Anselment 2009). 
Boyle’s Occasional Reflections upon Several Subjects, urged lay readers to mirror (if not to 
supplant) the observation of nature by professional scientists, notebook in hand and day by 
day. Furthermore, Boyle was explicit in acknowledging his debt to a genre of lay guides to daily 
spiritual exercises, that mirrored (but did not supplant) the ministrations of priests. The 
hermeneutical stance of early modernism drew its energy from one Book, and injected it into 
the other.  
 
A second structural flaw in the natural-theological reading of the second book became 
increasingly visible during the nineteenth century, and was exposed in the greatest clarity by the 
ascent of the theory of evolution by natural selection. The passivity of written text simply fails to 
follow faithfully the emergent explorative potential of the tree of life. A written word is written 
once, and implies an immediate and proximal author. Yet an evolved species, perfectly 
accommodated to its environmental niche, did not require a pen to inscribe it there. Once 
Hugh of St. Victor’s ‘figures’ start taking on lives of their own, speciating and exploring new 
‘texts’ within the code of life, the metaphor begins to add inadequacy to a tendency to mislead.  
Books are, in the modern period, increasingly commonly written as read. One might even 
venture to extend the metaphorical meshing of gears that connect the First Book and its 
reformational stimulation of works of personal hermaneutic and piety to a the new science of 
writing Nature that became a hallmark of early modern science. The Royal Society found it 
necessary to invent the scientific journal.  Boyle, and others, developed a new kind of writing 
and reporting scientific observation (one that detached, as far as was possible, the observer 
from the observed). Human relationship with Book of Nature turned from one of reading to 
one of writing. From there it is a small step to imagine nature writing the evolution of its own 
future into itself. 
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A third implication of the metaphor of the second book derives from its production. Books 
possess authors, and in most cases readers of a book may deduce something of the character 
and purpose of its author through more or less sophisticated levels of reading. Nature becomes 
a veiled or coded message from, and concerning, its Author. So if the Sacred Page can say of 
itself (Ephesians 3: 4-5 [NIV]) 
 
In reading this, then, you will be able to understand my insight into the mystery of Christ, which was 
not made known to people in other generations as it has now been revealed by the Spirit to God’s 
holy apostles and prophets 
 
then nature also becomes a once-veiled but increasingly transparent mode of insight into the 
person and nature of God. In the developed form of reading nature that became the 
nineteenth century movement known as Natural Theology, we look through nature towards a 
vision of its Creator. Wary as Luther was of the findings of early modern science, he was no 
critic of the second book analogy (Bornkamm 1958, 179): 
 
All creation is the most beautiful book or bible, for in it God has described and portrayed Himself. 
 
Attractive though such neo-oracular, albeit Christianised, interpretation of how to read nature 
might be, it runs as rapidly as the projection of the first problem into the thicket of theodicy – 
what must we deduce, in this mode of reading, about the creator of catastrophes and 
carnivores? We hear echoes of Augustine’s warning that readers will find evils as well as glories 
on the face of a reading of nature, and attribute both to the intentional fiat of its Writer. This 
reading also elicits Maxwell’s astute observation that books are written in order, with sequential 
explanation and development. Attempting to read a work more organic and fluid as if it were 
written as a single book leads to irresolvable hermeneutical problems. 
 
A fourth issue, delayed until it appears on the beach of the late-modern period as the tide of 
near-universal theism retreated, is a problematizing of scientific method itself. If the effective 
practice of science is unaffected by any personal stance of belief, and if both its methods and 
conclusions align with a material metaphysics, namely the set of practices and assumptions 
termed ‘methodological naturalism’ (Okello 2015), what value theistic belief and practice? To 
summarise the issue: the daily practice of scientific research is pursued etsi deus non daretur – 
the existence of, or belief in, a creating deity does not affect the laboratory or theoretical 
practice of science, or the likelihood of its success. Transcendence is not a scientific category, 
and science is pursued within an ontology of the material only. It is important to note the 
weakness of the claim: the extent of ‘naturalism’ is restricted to the methodological, not by 
extension to an entire worldview. Methodological naturalism does not imply metaphysical 
naturalism. Yet the adoption of methodological naturalism has sat uncomfortably with some 
believers, and some theologians (e.g. Plantinga 1997), because its deployment of a method that 
ostensibly ignores the divine seems to imply the irrelevance of a position of faith. However, 
attempts to reintroduce particular differences in scientific methodology with an ostensibly 
theistic methodology of science run into insuperable problems at the experiential and 
epistemological levels. A recent, and thorough, debate on the theological admissibility or 
otherwise of methodological naturalism has recently played out in the journal Zygon (Torrance 
2017, Ritchie and Perry 2018). There is not the space here to revisit the arguments of that 
debate, but I wish instead briefly to develop the discussion of how the problematizing of the 
grand Second Book metaphor might speak to the smaller but similar metaphor of self-written 
codes within nature. 
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Problems with the Metaphor of Coding 
 
At first blush, it is not a surprise that the vast overreach of the great Second Book metaphor for 
the whole of nature itself creates the four pitfalls (and others besides) on which it stumbles. It 
does not necessarily follow that the more carefully restricted script-metaphor of genetic coding 
will suffer from the same drawbacks. However I believe that there is something to be learned 
from their parallelism of seeking to illuminate nature in terms of writing and reading.  
 
The writing and reading of ‘code’ has, like the notion of a book, its own cultural history. 
Indeed the two are technologically entangled as the second century technological marvel of the 
‘codex’ testifies. Codes are open, or deliberately covert, aimed at a highly selected readership. 
They have carried the same twists of hierarchical power as the deployment  of books, and the 
Book, itself. As we have seen, the imputation of moral values to the genetic code is itself an 
anticipated category error anticipated by Augustine. 
 
The second ‘flaw’ of the original metaphor, that it opens up the possible confusion of writing as 
well as reading, in the case of the gene works rather differently. For this is the locus above all 
other in which the human ability to ‘write’ upon nature promises both the greatest rewards and 
the greatest dangers to the tree of life of which we are a part. Writing is precisely the technology 
we are now grappling with, yet finding ourselves short of guiding principles – the human genetic 
engineer is in new territory. Surprisingly, the theological tradition that worked so long with the 
metaphor of the Books is not so aridly conservative in this regard as one might at first suppose. 
This was my own surprise in a first attempt to explore a ‘theology of science’, but staring with 
the rarely-visited Wisdom tradition (McLeish 2014). This starting point elides to the third issue 
of the first book, but now the object of ‘natural theology’ becomes ourselves. What do we learn 
about the human authors of life’s futures by the choices we make when writing ourselves and 
our progeny? 
 
And once nature carries the deliberate script of human coders, we are led to wonder what 
might change in scientific methodology? The assumptions of ‘methodological naturalism’ 
would not be adequate to future explorers from another world, attempting to make sense of the 
tangled banks they find on third millennium planet Earth. For the coding of their organisms 
would not all have evolved through the process of natural selection. Without the assumption of 
other genetic agency, there would be no account possible of the modifications and extensions 
of genotype and phenotype that, for good or ill, the alien scientists encounter. 
 
Metaphors are powerful. Especially metaphors of writing and reading. They take us on 
journeys of their own, suggesting stories by which we might not only interpret, but also rewrite, 
our world. I will be always so immensely grateful to Evelyn Fox-Keller for teaching me how this 
is no less true for the work of science, as for the works of imagination, and by that just how 
essential is the creative imagination for science itself. 
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